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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
publicizing of her illegitimate status. After resolving numerous
procedural questions, the court ruled that:
(1) A putative father has the constitutional right 2 to establish
his status as the parent of an illegitimate child, and therefore has
some parental rights and duties which may be determined by
means of a declaratory judgment.13
(2) While the mother has no cause of action for breach of
promise to marry in Wisconsin," she does have a cause of action
for seduction. 5
(3) While generally Wisconsin does not recognize a cause of
action for invasion of privacy, the exception for an intentional
causing of emotional distress permits the cause of action as pleaded
in this case.4
(4) Due to public policy and possible social ramifications, an
illegitimate child has no cause of action against her natural father
for "wrongful birth."47
The complex substantive and procedural questions involved in
this case were remanded for further proceedings.
JOHN W. KNUTESON
REAL PROPERTY
I. LANDLORD AND TENANT
In the 1973 term the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided two
cases involving the law of landlord and tenant, concerning the
landlord's right to receive rent. In State ex rel. Building Owners
& Managers Association of Milwaukee, Inc. v. Adamany,1 a group
of property owner-landlords brought an original action in the su-
preme court seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitution-
42. The court relied upon two recent cases, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
43. WIs. STAT. § 269.56 (1971); 62 Wis. 2d at 305-307, 215 N.W.2d at 15-16.
44. WIs. STAT. § 248.01 and § 248.02 (1971).
45. 62 Wis. 2d at 310-312, 215 N.W.2d at 18-19; 43 MARQ. L. REV. 341, 356 (1960).
46. Id. at 315, 215 N.W.2d at 20, citing Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d
312 (1963).
47. 62 Wis. 2d at 316-318, 215 N.W.2d at 21-22.
I. 64 Wis. 2d 280, 219 N.W.2d 274 (1974).
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ality of section 539 of chapter 90, Laws of 19732 and an injunction
against enforcement of the statute. Section 539 was enacted for the
ostensible purpose of passing along to tenants the benefit of prop-
erty tax reductions which property owners were expected to receive
from pending legislation.' It required that every owner of rental
property reduce his lessee's rent obligation by the amount by which
the property taxes paid on that property in 1972 exceeded the
property taxes paid in 1973.
In this action, which was originally four separate cases which
were consolidated for hearing, the plaintiffs challenged the consti-
tutionality of the rent reduction law on nearly every conceivable
ground. Reasoning from the well settled premise that all legislation
is to be presumed constitutional until unconstitutionality has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt,4 the court rejected the plain-
tiffs' first contention that the statute served no public purpose. It
held that the attempt by the legislature to equitably distribute
anticipated tax concessions was, at least arguably, in furtherance
of a legitimate state interest. Similarly, the court rejected the argu-
ment that the rent reduction law constituted a property tax which
did not apply uniformly to all property as required by the Wiscon-
sin Constitution.' The court reasoned that since the statute did not
provide for the collection and disbursement of funds by the state,
it was not a tax within the accepted definition of the term, and the
uniformity rule did not apply.
The ultimate ruling that section 539 was unconstitutional was
based on the finding that enforcement of the law would impair the
obligation of contracts in violation of the United States and Wis-
consin Constitutions. 7 The court applied a strict interpretation of
2. Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 90, § 539 provided:
Section 539. Rent reductions due to property tax relief. On or before January 15,
1974, each owner of property in this state which is rented for use by others shall
reduce that portion of the annual rent due to property taxes on that property by a
dollar amount equal to the amount, if any, by which taxes paid devoted to property
for 1972 exceed property taxes paid on that property for 1973. If the property
includes more than one rental unit the amount of reduction shall be in the same
proportion that the rent from that unit bears to the rent of the entire property.
3. Although the intention or purpose of the legislature is nowhere stated, the court relied
on the statements made in Executive Budget Policy Paper No. 31, February 1973.
4. State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784
(1973); Gottlieb v. Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967).
5. WIs. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1.
6. State ex rel. Building Owners & Managers Ass'n. of Milw. v. Adamany, 64 Wis. 2d
at 289, 219 N.W.2d at 279.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 provides in part:
1975]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the contract clauses which had been adopted in earlier decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and the Wisconsin court' and
concluded that:
Because sec. 539 would require the landlords in these leases to
collect less rent than the leases obligate the renters to pay, the
enforcement of sec. 539 impairs the contractual obligation on
these leases in violation of the United States and Wisconsin Con-
stitution.
Sec. 539 would not merely affect the remedy to which a party
might resort for satisfaction of the contract, but would impair the
very consideration that was agreed upon. The lessor would re-
ceive less rent than he bargained for.'
Although it is well settled that contractual obligations enjoy
constitutional protection, there is another, equally well settled
principle that rights secured by contracts are not absolute but may
be amended or abrogated by a valid exercise of the state's police
power.' 0 The Wisconsin rule in this regard was stated in Kuhl
Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co." and reaffirmed by the court in
Adamany.
This court adheres to the basic philosophy of Kuhl, .... that an
unequivocal legislative declaration of public policy, made either
before or after the execution of a contract, becomes a part of that
contract if the legislature makes it clear that such is its intention
and if it can be determined, either by recitals in the legislation
or by judicial notice, that vital public interests will be impaired
if the legislation is not given effect and vital interests will be
enhanced by enforcement of the legislation. 12
The court concluded that under the Kuhl doctrine the rent
reduction law and the impairment of contracts which would result
from its enforcement could not be justified as a valid exercise of
No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of
marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and
silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law,
or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.
WIs. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides:
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of
contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or
forfeiture of estate.
8. In re Cranberry Creek Drainage District, 202 Wis. 64, 231 N.W. 588 (1930).
9. 64 Wis. 2d at 291, 219 N.W.2d at 280.
10. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
1I. 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955).
12. 64 Wis. 2d at 299, 219 N.W.2d at 284.
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the state's police power. Neither the drafters of the law nor its
proponents in this case satisfactorily demonstrated to the court
that exigent circumstances involving the public interest required
such an exercise of the police power, at the expense of constitution-
ally protected obligations. It should be noted that although the
court was highly critical of the rent reduction law, its criticism was
directed primarily at the legal insufficiency of the statute itself
rather than the policy of providing rent relief to tenants, and the
decision in Adamany does not foreclose the possibility of a similar,
but properly drafted, statute to achieve that purpose. 13
Where two or more persons have an interest in the same real
estate, and each claims the rents from that property, the accepted
rule is that the party entitled to possession of the property has the
right to receive the rents. 4 A number of Wisconsin cases have
extended the applicability of this rule to the situation in which a
property owner has pledged the rents from his property as addi-
tional security for a mortgage. Those cases hold that the mortga-
gee does not automatically become entitled to the pledged rents at
the occurrence of default but must actually take possession of the
property in a foreclosure action before such a right accrues.15 In
Lincoln Crest Realty, Inc. v. Standard Apartment Development of
West Allis, Inc.," the court considered for the first time whether
the rule is equally applicable to the situation in which a lessee has
pledged the rents from subleases to his lessor as security for the
lease.
Standard Apartment Development had contracted with Lin-
coln Crest Realty to build, finance and manage an apartment com-
plex under a twenty-five year lease. An assignment clause in the
lease provided that upon termination of the lease or a default on
the part of the lessee, the lessor, Lincoln Crest, would be entitled
to all of the rents received from the operation of the apartments.
To acquire sufficient operating capital, Standard borrowed money
from Midland National Bank and executed a second assignment
13. 64 Wis. 2d at 302, 219 N.W.2d at 286.
14. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 119 (1932):
The owner of a possessory estate for life, during the continuance of such estate has
the privilege of taking and receiving all issues and profits derived from the land.
Although this section applies to possessory life interests, it illustrates the common law
distinction between possessory and non-possessory interests in land relative to the right to
receive rents and profits.
15. Grether v. Nick, 193 Wis. 503, 213 N.W. 304 (1927); Wuorinen v. City Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n., 52 Wis. 2d 722, 191 N.W.2d 27 (1971).
16. 61 Wis. 2d 4, 211 N.W.2d 501 (1973).
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of rents as security for the loan. This second assignment was made
with the approval of Lincoln Crest and upon the express condition
that Midland's rights under the assignment would remain subordi-
nate to those of Lincoln Crest.
When Standard failed to meet its obligations under the lease,
Lincoln Crest issued a five-day termination notice which was to
expire on January 26, 1971. Standard neither paid its rent nor
surrendered the leased premises on that date, and on February 2,
1971 Lincoln Crest commenced an action seeking repossession of
the apartments and a judgment terminating the lease. Standard
had also defaulted on the loan from Midland, and on February 3,
1971 the bank appropriated all of the funds in Standard's operating
account, consisting largely of rents, as a setoff against the balance
due on the note. The trial court recognized that Midland had
merely exercised the common-law right of a creditor to go against
the debtor's property in his possession and had not exercised any
rights under the assignment. However, the court found that the
rent receipts were not subject to Midland's setoff because title to
them had vested in Lincoln Crest by operation of the assignment
prior to the date of the setoff.
The supreme court held that the rule requiring actual posses-
sion before a mortgagee can claim pledged rents was equally appl-
icable in the situation in which a pledge of rents has been given to
secure a lease. This is true even though a lessor is the holder of title,
whereas a mortgagee is only a lienholder under Wisconsin's lien
theory of mortgages. 7 The court, relying heavily on a California
decision, 8 concluded that the right to rents is an incident of posses-
sion and not a question of title. As stated by the court, "The lessor
does not have the right to rents and profits even though they have
been assigned until such time as he gains possession, either actual
or constructive, or by the appointment of a receiver."19
In this case, Lincoln Crest had neither taken possession of the
property nor secured the appointment of a receiver prior to Mid-
land's setoff, and according to the above stated rule, the rents
continued to belong to Standard and were subject to appropriation
by Midland.
17. Id. at 12, 211 N.W.2d at 505.
18. Childs Real Estate Co. v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697
(1943).
19. Lincoln Crest Realty, Inc. v. Standard Apartment Development, Inc., 61 Wis. 2d
at 11, 211 N.W.2d at 504.
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However, the court recognized that in certain situations, such
an assignment would effectively transfer the rents to the lessor
before he has repossessed the property. The right to rents will ripen
prior to repossession when the circumstances which will activate
the assignment are written with such specificity as will enable a
court to enforce the provision.
We hold that, in a lease agreement where there is an assignment
of rents and profits, that assignment becomes operative and
effective only when the lessor takes possession of the property or
at such time and under such circumstances as are detailed with
specificity in the agreement to a degree that a court may deter-
mine with certainty the effective date of the assignment of rents
and profits prior to the taking of possession, actual or construc-
tive. 0
The assignment provision in Lincoln Crest's lease had listed a
number of occurrences which would activate the assignment of
rents, most of which lacked sufficient specificity to effectively
transfer title to the rents without repossession of the property.2' But
the court conceded that the provision that the assignment would
become operative upon the termination or cancellation of the lease
would effectively transfer the rents to Lincoln Crest prior to repos-
session if the trial court had declared the lease to be terminated
on a certain date. In such a case, Lincoln Crest would acquire all
of the rents collected subsequent to that date, but the rents col-
lected previous to the termination date would be subject to Mid-
land's setoff.
Accordingly, the trial court's order directing Midland to turn
over the funds from Standard's account was overruled, and the
case was remanded for a determination of the precise date that the
lease was terminated.
II. CONDEMNATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN
Although few would challenge the state's general authority to
limit private rights in land when it is in the public interest to do
20. Id. at 15, 211 N.W.2d at 507.
21. The particular provision involved provided:
[S]uch assignment shall become operative and effective only in the event that this
lease and the terms thereof shall be terminated or cancelled pursuant to the terms
and conditions hereof, or in the event of the issuance and execution of a dispossess
warrant or other re-entry or repossession by Landlord under the provisions hereof,
or in the case of an event of default on the part of Tenant.
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so, the question of when such a limitation on private rights is
reasonably required is the subject of a great many disputes; e.g.,
the case of Posnanski v. West Allis. 22
Wisconsin Statute section 66.05(l)(a) gives the governing body
or building inspector of every municipality the authority to order
the razing of any private building which is in a dangerous state of
disrepair if it is determined that the cost of restoring the building
to an acceptable condition would be "unreasonable." Subdivision
(b) of section 66.05(1) prescribes a test for determining whether or
not the cost of repairs is "unreasonable" so as to foreclose the
option of restoring the building rather than razing it. Section
66.05(l)(b) provides:
Whenever a municipal governing body, inspector of buildings or
designated officer determines that the cost of such repairs would
exceed 50 per cent of the assessed value of such building divided
by the ratio of the assessed value to the recommended value as
last published by the state supervisor of assessments for the mu-
nicipality within which such building is located, such repairs shall
be presumed unreasonable and it shall be presumed for the pur-
pose of this section that such building is a public nuisance.
The plaintiff, Mary T. Posnanski, brought this action for judi-
cial review of an order of the building inspection department of
West Allis directing that she raze a building which she owned in
that city. At the hearing, the defendant municipality satisfactorily
demonstrated that to place the structure in an acceptable condition
would require the expenditure of a sum in excess of fifty per cent
of its value. Accordingly, the lower court found that the building
was in an unreasonable state of repair, and the defendant had the
authority to order its removal under section 66.05(1)(a).
On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the
fifty per cent of value test prescribed in section 66.05(l)(b) but did
not challenge the constitutionality of section 66.05(l)(a) which had
been established in an earlier decision." The plaintiff contended
that the statutory test imposed an arbitrary and rigid standard
which did not take into consideration possible mitigating circum-
stances.
The court rejected the plaintiff's challenge and based its deter-
mination in a literal interpretation of the statute's wording. Since
22. 61 Wis. 2d 461, 213 N.W.2d 51 (1973).
23. Appleton v. Brunschweiler, 52 Wis. 2d 303, 190 N.W.2d 545 (1971).
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the statute is phrased in terms of creating a rebuttable presumption
of unreasonableness, it cannot be maintained that it establishes an
arbitrary standard in violation of constitutional principles. So con-
strued, the statute would not prevent the restoration of historic or
cultural landmarks at an expense in excess of fifty per cent of their
value. Furthermore, any property owner faced with an application
of the statue would have the opportunity to rebut the presumption
of unreasonableness.
The dispute in Jantz v. State24 arose out of a very limited fact
situation, but the supreme court's decision is nevertheless signifi-
cant because of the distinction made between the state's power of
eminent domain and the state's police power in relation to private
interests in land. A property owner brought this action against the
state seeking compensation for damages arising out of a highway
improvement project which required a partial taking of land and
a contemporaneous change of road grade. A portion of the plain-
tiff's property had been raised substantially, and although no addi-
tional land had been taken, the change of grade was alleged to have
decreased the commercial value of the property.
The property owner argued that the change of grade and the
widening of the road constituted a single action by the state. Where
a single exercise of the state's power of eminent domain necessarily
involves a change of grade, Wisconsin Statute section 32.09(6)25
entitles the property owner to compensation for all of the damage
caused thereby.
In opposition, the state contended that since the widening of the
one road did not necessarily entail the grade change of the other,
two separate and distinct actions had been taken by the state.
Where a change of grade does not require a taking of property,
Wisconsin Statute section 32.1826 controls, and damages are ord.i-
24. 63 Wis. 2d 404, 217 N.W.2d 266 (1974).
25. Wis. STAT. § 32.09(6) provides in part as follows:
(6) In the case of a partial taking the compensation to be paid by the condemnor
shall be determined by deducting from the fair market value of the whole property
immediately before the date of evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder
immediately after the date of evaluation, . . . to the following items of loss or
damage to the property where shown to exist:
(i) Damages to property abutting on a highway right of way due to change of
grade where accompanied by a taking of land.
26. Wis. STAT. § 32.18 entitled Damage caused by change of grade of street or highway
where no land is taken; claim; right of action, provides in part as follows:
Where a street or highway improvement project undertaken by the highway
commission, a county, city, town or village, causes a change of grade of such street
1975]
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narily not compensable. In such a situation, the state's action is
viewed as an exercise of its police power which permits injury
without compensation .
In Jantz, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision
that the change of grade and the widening constituted two separate
state actions. Accordingly, the plaintiff was duly compensated for
the loss suffered by reason of the partial taking under eminent
domain authority, but was denied recovery for the loss which re-
sulted from the exercise of the police power.
III. ZONING
Two decisions of the past term have clarified significantly the
Wisconsin position regarding the procedure whereby property
owners can seek judicial review of municipal zoning ordinances
and orders. In Kmiec v. Spider Lake2 8 the plaintiffs had purchased
a large section of unzoned property to be developed for recrea-
tional purposes. After considerable improvements had been made,
the town of Spider Lake adopted a zoning plan which classified the
plaintiffs' property as an agricultural district. Following two un-
successful attempts to get the property reclassified, an action was
commenced in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. The plaintiffs argued,
and the trial court agreed, that the classification of the plaintiffs'
property as an agricultural district was an exercise of municipal
authority without logical basis which deprived the owners of the
value of their property in violation of the Wisconsin and United
States Constitutions .2 The issues presented on appeal were:
1. Whether plaintiffs should have been required to exhaust their
administrative remedies before commencing this declaratory
judgment action?
2. Whether the classification of plaintiffs' property as A-i, ag-
ricultural district has no logical basis and is utterly unreasonable,
as determined by the trial court?"
In regard to the second issue, the court affirmed the trial
or highway . . . but does not require a taking of any abutting lands, the owner of
such lands at the date of such change of grade may file with the highway commission
a claim for any damages to said lands occasioned by such change of grade. . ..
27. Schneider v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 458, 187 N.W.2d 172 (1971).
28. 60 Wis. 2d 640, 211 N.W.2d 471 (1973).
29. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 13, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30. Kmiec v. Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d at 644, 211 N.W.2d at 472.
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court's decision that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional',
as applied to the plaintiffs' property. This determination was based
on two considerations. First, since the property had not been
farmed for eleven years and was actually unsuitable for farming,
the classification was utterly unreasonable. Secondly, the classifi-
cation had substantially diminished the value of the property.
On the first issue, it was argued by the defendant municipality
that the state courts were without jurisdiction to render declaratory
relief because the plaintiffs had not exhausted the available admin-
istrative remedies. The exhaustion of remedies doctrine, as applied
in zoning matters, requires that where relief from zoning ordi-
nances is sought, the property owner may not resort to the courts
until all of the remedies provided by the municipal zoning author-
ity have been exhausted.32 While recognizing the continuing valid-
ity of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in most situations, the
court held that it was inapplicable when the constitutionality of a
particular zoning ordinance has been challenged. A municipal
administrative agency is ill equipped and unauthorized to resolve
the issue of law which is raised by a challenge to the constitutional
validity of a zoning ordinance.3 3 Therefore, it was appropriate for
the plaintiffs to seek relief in the form of a declaratory judgment.
Master Disposal, Inc. v. Menomonee Falls34 arose out of a
nearly identical fact situation and involved many of the same con-
siderations presented in Kmiec. The plaintiff had purchased ten
acres of swampland in the village of Menomonee Falls which was
to have been used an an industrial landfill site. At the date of
purchase, the village zoning ordinances classified the property as
"wetland" and provided that filling was permissable if approved
by the plan commission. After the plaintiff was initially denied
permission but before the commission's ruling could be appealed,
the property was rezoned and reclassified as "floodplains." Under
the new classification the property could not be filled under any
circumstances, and the plaintiff was foreclosed from any further
administrative relief. The plaintiff commenced an action in the
circuit court for a declaratory judgment on the issue of procedural
due process. The plaintiff appealed from an order granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
31. Id. at 652, 211 N.W.2d at 477.
32. Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis. 39, 51 N.W.2d 518 (1952).
33. 60 Wis. 2d at 646, 211 N.W.2d at 473.
34. Id. at 653, 211 N.W.2d at 477.
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On its own initiative the supreme court raised the issue of
whether or not the plaintiff had invoked the state courts' jurisdic-
tion to review the decision of the Menomonee Falls zoning board
of appeals, and concluded that it had not. Wisconsin Statute sec-
tion 62.23(7)(e)35 provides that the appropriate procedure for ob-
taining a judicial review of a decision by a municipal zoning board
is by petition for a writ of certiorari. A number of earlier Wiscon-
sin decisions have held that the writ of certiorari is the exclusive
remedy to challenge the action of a municipal zoning authority.
31
The court affirmed the position taken in the earlier Wisconsin
cases, and ruled that the writ of certiorari is the exclusive remedy
available to a property owner who wishes to challenge the decision
of a municipal zoning body or the constitutionality of the proceed-
ing in which the decision was reached. Accordingly, both the trial
court and the supreme court were without jurisdiction to render the
requested declaratory judgment, and the plaintiff's appeal was dis-
missed.
There is a crucial distinction which explains the apparent incon-
sistency of these two decisions. The plaintiff in Master Disposal
challenged the constitutionality of the zoning board's application
and enforcement of an ordinance. In that situation, the exclusive
means of obtaining judicial review is the writ of certiorari which
will issue only after all administrative remedies have been ex-
hausted.3 1 In contrast, the plaintiffs in Kmiec challenged the con-
stitutional validity of the zoning ordinance itself. In that situation,
a significant issue of law is raised which a zoning board has no
authority to resolve. Consequently, the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine is inapplicable, and judicial review of the ordinance may
be obtained in a declaratory judgment proceeding. 3
35. WIs. STAT. § 62.23(7)(e) provides in part:
10. Any person or persons, jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the
board of appeals . . . may present to a court of record a petition, duly verified,
setting forth that such decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds
of the illegality . ..
II. Upon the presentation of such petition the court may allow a writ of certior-
ari directed to the board of appeals in order to review such decision of the board of
appeals. . ..
36. Fersh v. Schroedel, 241 Wis. 457, 6 N.W.2d 176 (1942); State ex rel. Martin v.
Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 300 N.W. 187 (1941).
37. Master Disposal, Inc. v. Menomonee Falls, 60 Wis. 2d at 659, 211 N.W.2d at 480.
38. Id.
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IV. TORT LIABILITY
A. Slander of Title
The common law recognized a cause of action in favor of a
property owner against another who had falsely and maliciously
asserted a claim on his title.39 This common law rule was recently
codified in Wisconsin Statute section 706.13, which provides:
Slander of title. In addition to any criminal penalty or civil rem-
edy provided by law, the execution, placing of record or both of
any instrument relating to the title to land, knowing the matter
represented in such instrument to be false, spurious or sham, and
intending thereby falsely to cloud or encumber the title, shall
subject the person so executing or recording the same to liability
in tort for damages, recoverable at the suit of any person inter-
ested in the land whose title is thereby impaired, in the penalty
sum of $1,000, plus any actual damages caused thereby.
Although the heavily confused facts of Schlytter v.
Lesperance° and the narrow issue resolved are not themselves no-
teworthy, the case is significant as the first judicial interpretation
of section 706.13. The plaintiffs had purchased investment prop-
erty from the defendants. The defendants later alleged that the
deed had actually been a mortgage and recorded an affidavit with
the register of deeds in which they asserted their claim to the
plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs commenced an action to quiet
title to the property, but during the trial the complaint was
amended to include a cause of action for slander of title pursuant
to section 706.13 which had since become effective. Although not
entirely clear from the record on appeal, it appears that the trial
court quieted title to the property in the plaintiffs, but sustained
the defendants' demurrer to the claim for the $1,000 penalty on the
ground that section 706.13 could not be applied retroactively.
However, the trial court rejected the defense of the statute of limi-
tations, and found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover actual
damages for slander of title under the common law rule.
While expressing its frustration with the inconclusive trial court
record,4' the supreme court ultimately held that section 706.13
39. Feiten v. City of Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494, 2 N.W. 1148 (1879); 53 C.J.S. Libel and
Slander §§ 276, 278 (1948).
40. 62 Wis. 2d 661, 215 N.W.2d 552 (1974).
41. It appears that the trial court's final judgment was amended after the defendants
had filed their notice of appeal, and the court was unable to clearly determine the issues on
appeal.
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could not be applied retroactively so as to entitle the plaintiffs to
the $1,000 penalty. The court further held that the plaintiffs' com-
mon law action for slander of title was subject to the defense of
the statute of limitations, since the enactment of section 706.13
could not revive a cause of action against which the statute had
run. Accordingly, the case was remanded to determine the exist-
ence of a common law cause of action and the applicability of the
statute of limitations.12
In the court's comparison of the common law cause of action
for slander of title and the new statutory cause of action, several
statements are made which unfortunately raise a potentially trou-
blesome question in regard to the element of actual damages. The
opinion states:
We think there exists a cause of action for a malicious, inten-
tional slander of title at common law and that sec. 706.13, Stats.,
so .far as damages are concerned, was merely declaratory of the
common law 3 . . . .The section, being merely declaratory of
the common law, did not create a cause of action nor did it
destroy the common law cause of action." (Emphasis added)
It would appear well settled that at common law an essential
element of a cause of action for slander of title is that the property
owner must have sustained actual, pecuniary loss as a direct result
of the slander of his title. Without the element of special damage,
no cause of action for slander of title exists.45 In what appears to
be the only other Wisconsin case on the subject of slander of title,
it was stated that:
Such an assault upon the title of another, to be actionable, must
be made maliciously and without probable cause. If so made, it
may amount to slander of title and be actionable, and the dam-
ages may be increased by unnecessary delay in prosecuting the
action. The rule is that "language concerning a thing is actiona-
ble when published maliciously, Le., without lawful excuse, if it
also occasions damage to the owner of the thing."4
In contrast, section 706.13 is phrased in terms which clearly
42. Schlytter v. Lesperance, 62 Wis. 2d at 666, 215 N.W.2d at 555.
43. Id. at 666, 215 N.W.2d at 554.
44. Id. at 667, 215 N.W.2d at 555.
45. Feiten v. City of Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494, 2 N.W. 1148 (1879); 53 C.J.S. Libel and
Slander §§ 276, 278 (1948).
46. 47 Wis. at 498, 2 N.W. at 1150.
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imply that an action may be maintained for recovery of the $1,000
penalty alone, and that actual damages are only an additional,
optional item of recovery. It is submitted that if section 706.13 is
to be construed as allowing the recovery of the penalty sum in the
absence of actual damage, then the enactment of this statute cre-
ated a cause of action where none existed at common law, contrary
to the language in Schlytter.
B. Interference with Ground Water
Sinse the decision of Huber v. Merkel" in 1903, the Wisconsin
rule relative to unchanneled ground water has been that the owner
of land has an absolute license to use or waste the water which
flows beneath his land without incurring liability for any injury
caused to adjoining landowners. In State v. Michels Pipeline Con-
struction, Inc.,48 the court finally overruled the outmoded Huber
rule, and recognized a cause of action in favor of those who suffer
unreasonable harm because of the lowering of their water table.
The defendant, Michels Pipeline Construction, had been en-
gaged by the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of Milwaukee
to install a sewer in the city of Greenfield along a construction
easement granted for that purpose by the county. To facilitate the
laying of the pipeline, a large quantity of water was pumped out
of various wells in the area in order to lower the water table to a
depth of forty feet. As a direct result, many private wells in the
area were dried up, and the subsidence of the soil caused the crack-
ing of foundations and driveways. The state, on behalf of numerous
property owners affected by the defendants' action, brought a pub-
lic nuisance action to require that the sewer be constructed in a
manner which would not cause damage. The trial court correctly
interpreted the Huber ruling, and held that no cause of action
existed for interference with ground water.
On appeal, the supreme court considered at length the question
of whether the defendants' action could properly constitute a "pub-
lic nuisance" in view of the fact that private property rights rather
than a public interest were involved. The court reviewed a long line
of Wisconsin cases which have held that the scope of the injury
rather than the type of injury will determine whether a nuisance is
public or private. 9 Consequently, the court concluded that since a
47. 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903).
48. 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
49. Boden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1959); Hartung v. Milwaukee
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sufficiently large number of persons had been affected, the com-
plaint had properly alleged a public nuisance.
The court's ultimate conclusion that the Huber rule could no
longer be supported was based on three principal considerations.
First, it was determined that although the ruling in Huber pur-
ported to follow the prevalent English or common law rule of its
day, it had actually gone beyond that rule in providing that even a
malicious interference with ground water did not affect the rule of
non-liability."s For this reason, the case has received severe criti-
cism from many authorities.5'
Secondly, the underlying rationale for the rule was that the flow
pattern of ground water was too mysterious and unpredictable to
be regulated or to serve as the basis of liability for interference as
had been done in the case of surface streams.12 The court recog-
nized that modern scientific knowledge would no longer support
the arbitrary distinction between surface and ground waters or the
Huber rule of non-liability since
a cause and effect relationship can be established between
a tapping of underground water and the level of the water table
in the area so that liability can be fairly adjudicated consonant
with due process. Our scientific knowledge also establishes the
inteidependence of all water systems.5 3
Thirdly, the common law position of absolute ownership of
ground water can no longer be considered the prevalent view in this
country since twenty-eight states have rejected it in favor of more
modern rules which impose liability for unreasonable interference
with ground water which adversely affects others.
In deciding which of several alternative rules should be adopted
in place of the Huber rule, the court considered in detail those
adopted in other states," but selected instead the rule set forth in
Section 858A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tentative
Draft No. 17, 1971) which provides:
Non-liability for use of ground water - exceptions
A possessor of land or his grantee who withdraws ground
County, 2 Wis. 2d 475, 87 N.W.2d 799 (1957); Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537,
76 N.W.2d 355 (1956).
50. State v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d at 289, 217 N.W.2d at 344
(1974).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 291, 217 N.W.2d at 345.
54. Id. at 298, 217 N.W.2d at 349.
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water from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not
subject to liability for interference with the use of water by an-
other, unless
(a) The withdrawal of water causes unreasonable harm
through lowering the water table or reducing artesian pressure,
(b) The ground water forms an underground stream, in
which case the rules stated in sec. 850A to 857 are applicable, or
(c) The withdrawal of water has a direct and substantial
effect upon the water of a watercourse or lake, in which case the
rules stated in secs. 850A to 857 are applicable.
Thus, the Restatement rule continues to recognize the right of
a property owner to utilize ground water without incurring liabil-
ity, but imposes certain limitations which appear enforceable, yet
flexible enough to apply fairly in a wide variety of circumstances.
ERIC J. VAN VUGT
TAXATION
I. TAXATION AND THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP
After.only a very few years experience with the federal income
tax as originally enacted, legislators were made acutely aware of
the different tax results between married individuals living in sepa-
rate property states and those living in community property states.
Under the community property theory, all income earned by mar-
ried couples was split equally between them. Naturally the tax
burden was considerably lower than that sustained in separate
property states where one party earned all or substantially more
of the income than the other. The remedy for such unequal taxa-
tion was to adopt income splitting in the form of the joint return
as part of the Internal Revenue Code.' The joint return affords
similar treatment to married individuals respective of state law.2
A. Income Splitting
Prior to 1965, income taxation in Wisconsin made no reference
to the federal tax base. The Wisconsin Legislature enacted an
income tax "simplification law' 3 in July of 1965 which provided
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013.
2. McClure v. United States, 228 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1955).
3. Wis. Laws 1965, ch. 163.
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